

Energy Security and Net Zero Committee

The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation

Fourth Report of Session 2024–26

HC 1212

Energy Security and Net Zero Committee

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Publication

This Report, together with formal minutes relating to the Report, was Ordered by the House of Commons, on 21 October 2025, to be printed. It was published on 24 October 2025 by authority of the House of Commons.

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Summary

The draft National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation (EN-7) makes a strong case for nuclear energy as a reliable, low-carbon source of power. We welcome the updated, more flexible criteria-based approach to siting policy, which should enable a broader range of sites and technologies to come forward. However, applicants proposing new nuclear infrastructure will need clear guidance and support from government and Great British Energy–Nuclear (GBE-N) to meet the criteria effectively. Without this, the flexibility promised by the criteria-based model risks uncertainty and delay.

As we said in our previous Report, *Gridlock or Growth*, there is a tension between the Government’s stated commitment to a market-led energy policy and the reality of increasing government intervention. The Government needs to be clearer about what nuclear infrastructure it wants built, whereabouts, and on what timeline. Great British Energy–Nuclear should clarify its role in supporting deployment and, in particular, confirm its intentions for the sites it owns at Oldbury and Wylfa without further delay.

While the proposed criteria in EN-7 are, in principle, sensible, we are concerned that the process for assessing them in an application for Development Consent may duplicate matters already addressed by specialist regulators, adding cost and delay. EN-7 should be amended to make clearer that planning examinations should not replicate tests from other regulatory regimes, and detailed guidance should be published to help applicants understand what evidence is reasonably required. The independent Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has already called for radical reform; its final report should consider how to bring planning, safety, and environmental regulation together into a “one stop shop” while maintaining high standards.

We examined two of the criteria in more detail. The first is socioeconomic impact. Large nuclear developments can bring significant economic opportunities to host communities but also disruption. Future nuclear technologies may offer fewer local jobs and benefits than in previous generations. If EN-7 is to help secure public support for new nuclear, it should expand on the socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear and set clearer expectations for developers to deliver lasting value.

The second criterion we considered is the requirement for nuclear sites to be in areas of low population density. We accept the rationale for retaining this established criterion but have heard evidence that its methodology is ripe for reform and its implementation is opaque. We call for the Government to commission the Office for Nuclear Regulation to develop alternatives and, in the meantime, to publish the existing criterion as a simple map.

1 Introduction

Background

1. The UK has around 6GW of nuclear electricity generating capacity across five power stations, which in 2024 accounted for a seventh of all electricity generated.¹ All but one of these power stations is due to close in the next five years. Conservative and Labour governments in recent years have shown increased interest in replacing this ageing fleet, looking to nuclear for its low-carbon baseload power and its contribution to energy security.
2. In April 2022, the Government published the *British Energy Security Strategy*,² setting an ambition to increase nuclear capacity to “up to 24 GW” by 2050. This was reaffirmed in *Civil Nuclear: Roadmap to 2050*,³ published in January 2024. We launched our inquiry *Revisiting the Nuclear Roadmap* in February 2025 seeking to understand what the new Government’s nuclear ambitions are and how it intends to achieve them.
3. In July 2025 the Government confirmed the Final Investment Decision on Sizewell C and, in September, the governments of the UK and the USA announced an agreement to collaborate on the research and licensing of civil nuclear technologies.⁴
4. We expect this Report to be followed shortly by the final report of the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce, established by the Government in April 2025 as a temporary commission to review the regulation of civil and defence nuclear activities, including relevant aspects of the planning regime. The interim report of the Taskforce, published on 11 August, found that, despite a strong safety record, the UK’s nuclear regulatory system has become “increasingly complex and bureaucratic, leading to huge delays and ballooning costs, often for marginal benefit”.⁵ It called for “fundamental once-in-a-generation change in the regulatory system to enable the UK’s nuclear sector to thrive and take full advantage of the global resurgence of nuclear technology”.

1 DESNZ, [Digest of UK Energy Statistics \(DUKES\) 2025 Chapter 5: Electricity](#), 31 July 2025, p 5

2 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, [British energy security strategy](#), 7 April 2022

3 DESNZ, [Civil nuclear: roadmap to 2050](#)

4 Prime Minister’s Office, [Technology Prosperity Deal](#), 18 September 2025

5 DESNZ and MOD, [Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce: interim report](#), 11 August 2025

EN-7

5. National Policy Statements (NPSs) are designated under the Planning Act 2008 to set out the Government's policy for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs). They establish the need for development and the principles for assessing applications for Development Consent Orders (DCOs). Once designated, an NPS provides the primary basis for making decisions on DCOs. Currently, the Planning Act requires that an NPS must undergo public consultation and parliamentary scrutiny.
6. The draft NPS for Nuclear Energy Generation (EN-7), is intended to replace EN-6, which has applied since 2011 to projects deployable by the end of 2025. EN-6 identified eight sites in England and Wales considered potentially suitable for new gigawatt-scale nuclear stations. EN-7 moves to a criteria-based approach which would enable developers to propose new sites. It covers Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) as well as large-scale nuclear power stations.

Consultation and scrutiny

7. The first consultation on a new siting approach for nuclear power was run by the Government from January to March 2024. On 6 February 2025, the current Energy Secretary wrote to us to say that he had laid the draft EN-7 before Parliament⁶ and began a second consultation, which ran until 3 April. On 13 June he wrote again with the outcome of this second consultation. We then agreed with the Department to run an expedited programme of scrutiny, with a view to reporting shortly after the conference recess and allowing the Government to designate EN-7 by the end of 2025.
8. Britain is undertaking a fundamental transformation of its energy infrastructure to meet net zero targets and improve security of supply. By separating strategic policy debate from individual commissioning decisions, National Policy Statements are a very important tool for effecting this transformation. The choices made in them have far-reaching consequences for the infrastructure built and not built. As highlighted by the independent Banner Review of legal challenges to NSIPs, outdated and ambiguously worded NPSs leave infrastructure projects open to judicial review:⁷ something that we have heard has repeatedly delayed nuclear projects.⁸

6 [Letter from the Secretary of State regarding the Nuclear Energy Regulation Review and National Policy Statement](#), 6 February 2025

7 Paragraph 31.4, [Independent review into legal challenges against Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects - GOV.UK](#)

8 See, for example [Q8](#)

9. This Report builds on our previous Report, *Gridlock or Growth*, which reviewed the Government's proposed updates to EN-1 (the overarching energy NPS), EN-3 (renewable energy infrastructure) and EN-5 (electricity networks). There, we discussed the importance of thorough Parliamentary scrutiny of NPSs and recommended some improvements to the process. We therefore welcome the Government's cooperation in waiting for the conclusion of this accelerated inquiry before designating EN-7.
10. We ran a short call for evidence from 20 July to 17 August and received 26 submissions. We held an oral evidence session on 10 September with representatives from industry, regulators, and planning bodies. In the limited time available we have not been able to consider every aspect of EN-7, instead concentrating on some general thoughts on the criteria-based model it introduces, and the shortcomings of a few important criteria. We look forward to revisiting this subject in more depth as part of our broader inquiry into nuclear power.

Box 1: Glossary of terms used in this report

Nuclear energy is produced by splitting atomic nuclei in a controlled chain reaction process called nuclear fission. Nuclear energy is considered low-carbon because it does not emit greenhouse gases during electricity generation. (Some experimental designs intend to use nuclear *fusion*, where nuclei are combined instead of split. Fusion is outside the scope of EN-7 and will be dealt with in EN-8.)

Gigawatt-scale refers to large nuclear power stations with electrical output typically exceeding a gigawatt (GW). 1GW represents the average household electricity consumption of roughly 3 million British households.

Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are nuclear fission reactors designed to be built in factories and transported in sections for easier assembly on site. They are smaller than traditional nuclear plants and typically generate a few hundred megawatts of electricity or less.

Advanced Modular Reactors (AMRs) are next-generation nuclear designs that use novel fuels or coolants. As well as generating electricity, some AMRs are designed to produce heat for use in industrial processes like the production of steel or hydrogen.

A **Development Consent Order (DCO)** is a statutory instrument made under the Planning Act 2008 to consolidate multiple consents for nationally significant infrastructure projects (NSIPs), including large electricity generating stations. DCOs are made by the relevant Secretary of State, advised by the Planning Inspectorate (acting as the “Examining Authority”), which conducts a formal examination of the proposal.

Great British Energy–Nuclear (GBE–N), formerly known as **Great British Nuclear**, is the arm’s-length body set up by the Government in 2023 to lead the development and delivery of new nuclear power projects.

2 The criteria-based approach

11. The draft EN-7 makes a strong case for the urgent need for new nuclear capacity on the grounds of energy security and decarbonisation. The introductory sections position nuclear as an essential part of the energy system and a driver of economic growth and skilled employment. As in our previous report on energy NPSs, we support the presumption of consent for low-carbon infrastructure with Critical National Priority status.

A new approach to siting

12. Nuclear developers applying for Development Consent under EN-7 must assess their proposals against the criteria listed in Box 2. This marks a significant departure from EN-6, which was based on a strategic siting assessment carried out by government which turned up eight potentially suitable sites in England and Wales, all of which were existing nuclear sites.
13. Evidence to this inquiry is mixed in its support for the criteria-based approach, but there is a clear recognition, particularly from industry, that it could create opportunities compared to the fixed nature of EN-6. This was echoed in the response to the 2024 Government consultation.⁹ We have heard that the sites identified in EN-6 are insufficient to meet the ambitions of government and industry, and that EN-7 may help accommodate a wider range of locations and technologies, including sites that may not be suitable for large-scale reactors but could host SMRs or AMRs.¹⁰
14. From the evidence we have seen, we detect a cautious optimism among developers and investors about the criteria-based approach. Centrica, for example, describes EN-7 as an “important step towards enabling a more flexible and responsive planning framework for nuclear development”.¹¹ However, it remains to be seen whether this approach will deliver in practice. We have heard concerns about the need for more detailed guidance on how to apply the criteria and how to engage the named

9 DESNZ, [National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation \(EN-7\): new consultation, and response to earlier consultation](#), 11 February 2025, para 2.4.3

10 [Qq3-4](#)

11 Centrica ([NPE0027](#))

statutory consultees and regulators.¹² Prospective nuclear developers have told us that while EN-6 has been restrictive in its limited number of proposed sites, the existence of such sites did at least give them greater confidence to invest in costly preparatory work and bring forward proposals.¹³

15. We also heard from those sceptical of the new approach, who argued that moving away from sites identified through a strategic siting assessment could result in developers pursuing suboptimal locations for reasons of expediency rather than national interest.¹⁴ And some developers feared that too open-ended an attitude to siting might prevent a pipeline of gigawatt-scale nuclear coming forward at the few sites where it is most suitable.¹⁵

16. **CONCLUSION**

We welcome the introduction of a framework that gives a strong presumption of consent for low-carbon generation and accommodates a broader range of nuclear technologies. However, confidence in a developer-led approach is not yet assured and will only come if DESNZ, GBE-N, and the Planning Inspectorate can collectively provide DCO applicants with the support and guidance they will need to carry out proportionate assessments against the criteria. Without this, there is a risk that the flexibility promised by EN-7 will translate into uncertainty and delay.

The role of the state

17. At the heart of this debate is the lack of precedent for private development of new nuclear sites. Britain's existing nuclear sites were all established before electricity privatisation (the most recent being Torness in East Lothian, some 50 years ago) and we are not aware of any civil nuclear programme worldwide in which the state has not played a decisive role in strategic siting.
18. Several witnesses, including the Government's own arm's-length delivery body GBE-N,¹⁶ called for a greater role for government in providing early assurance or "in principle" support for a site. This could take the form of indicative site assessments, coordinated engagement with statutory consultees, or support from GBE-N to secure resources such as cooling water and grid connections before developers commit substantial capital.

12 newcleo ([NPE0018](#))

13 X-energy UK ([NPE0012](#)), para 31

14 Colchester City Council ([NPE0005](#))

15 EDF ([NPE0002](#))

16 Great British Energy - Nuclear ([NPE0006](#))

The Nuclear Industry Association has further suggested that GBE-N be tasked with carrying out a new siting study and identifying “a non-exhaustive list of potential sites for new nuclear power stations beyond the EN-6 sites”.¹⁷

19. GBE-N itself owns two of the most important sites, Oldbury and Wylfa, but has not yet confirmed its deployment plans. The success of EN-7 will depend significantly on how GBE-N acts as both champion and investor in this space, and we intend to return to this crucial question in our broader nuclear inquiry.

20. **CONCLUSION**

As we said in our previous Report, *Gridlock or Growth*, there remains a fundamental tension between the Government’s stated preference for a market-led approach to energy and the trend towards active government management. This is especially apparent in nuclear policy, where siting for gigawatt-scale plants has always required some degree of state backing. Given this reality, the Government needs to be considerably more explicit about what nuclear technologies it wants deployed and where it envisages them being located.

21. **RECOMMENDATION**

When designating EN-7, the Government should publish a plan with its preferred level and mix of nuclear technologies, indicative deployment timelines, and the role of EN-6 sites potentially suitable for gigawatt-scale plants. Each part of this plan should explain the role of GBE-N in facilitating it.

22. **RECOMMENDATION**

GBE-N should announce its plans for Oldbury and Wylfa without further delay, including which technologies it intends to deploy.

Regulatory duplication

23. The criteria in Box 2 replicate many of those used in the Strategic Siting Assessment (SSA) under EN-6. Individually they appear sensible and each relates to qualities desirable for a nuclear power station. However, evidence we have heard suggests that not all of these criteria are suited to detailed consideration within the DCO process. Some are already addressed in other statutory regimes, such as Justification and site licensing. As the interim report of the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce notes, the planning

17 Nuclear Industry Association ([NPE0008](#)), 1.e.ii.

system can contribute to duplication of regulation: delaying decisions and risking matters being considered at neither the best time nor by the most appropriate body.

Box 2: Site criteria in the draft EN-7

EN-7 lists 24 site criteria to be assessed as part of a DCO application for nuclear infrastructure. Unlike in the previous EN-6, all criteria must be satisfied; they are no longer distinguished as “exclusionary” or “discretionary”, although some have more flexibility than others in how they might be met.¹⁸ Criteria are organised in three broad categories, ordered from early consideration through to eventual impacts. Where criteria require consideration at multiple stages they are repeated.

Factors Influencing Site Selection

These criteria are used at the earliest stage to sift out unsuitable sites using broad, location-based constraints that affect whether a site is viable in principle for nuclear development:

Population density; Proximity to military activities; Flooding; Coastal and other landform change; Proximity to major hazard sites and major accident hazard pipelines; Proximity to civil aircraft and spacecraft movements; Biodiversity and geological conservation; Areas of amenity, landscape value and heritage significance; Size of site; and Access to suitable sources of cooling.

Technical Considerations

Once a site is selected, Technical Considerations relate to the practical feasibility of how a given design can be safely and effectively designed and operated:

Proximity to civil aircraft and spacecraft movements; Access to transmission infrastructure; Size of site; Seismic hazards and ground instability; Emergency planning; and Meteorological conditions.

Impacts

Having selected a site and a feasible design, developers are required to identify environmental and social impacts of a development, which must be addressed using the mitigation hierarchy:

Flood risk; Water quality and resources; Coastal and other landform change; Biodiversity and geological impacts; Landscape, heritage significance and visual impacts; Socioeconomic impacts; Human health and wellbeing; and Traffic and transport.

18 DESNZ, [National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation \(EN-7\): new consultation, and response to earlier consultation](#), 11 February 2025, para 1.1.7.v

24. Many witnesses stressed the need for the UK to pursue a “fleet” approach to nuclear deployment to capture economies of scale and standardisation. A planning system that is heavily front-loaded with requirements for detailed information, on aspects that will later be tested again by specialist regulators, risks discouraging that approach.
25. Whereas the SSA sought only to establish that sites were “potentially suitable”, the criteria in EN-7 are framed more prescriptively. This shift has also codified some factors previously treated by EN-6 as “Flags for Local Consideration”. For example, seismic hazards were under EN-6 considered a matter for the ONR as part of site licensing.¹⁹ In the draft EN-7 they are listed as a Technical Consideration, requiring assessment. During our evidence session, the Chief Nuclear Inspector argued that this provides early go/no-go guidance to avoid developers investing heavily in sites that would later fail licensing, saying that if a developer:

came through the licensing process with something that EN-7 would have picked up [...] it could potentially involve a lot of money and cost to justify something that could have been picked up far earlier.²⁰

This view is symptomatic of a wider problem of planning examinations repeating tests that properly belong to other regimes. If private developers and their investors need earlier assurance on the viability of their proposals, it would be best achieved if regulators could act in a more joined-up way. As the Nuclear Futures Institute noted to us:

In an ideal world all three regulators [planning, nuclear safety, and environmental] would work together to review site applications and agree a site approval regulatory schedule between themselves and the developer to ensure that the appropriate documentation was produced for each regulator at the appropriate time to meet the developer’s project timescales. The schedule could be in two phases: the first would identify any “show-stoppers” early to avoid unnecessary work and cost for everyone. The second phase of the schedule would lead up to a simultaneous issuing of a development consent, a nuclear site licence and the appropriate environmental permit.²¹

26. Other remedies suggested to us by witnesses include a suggestion from Catherine Anderson of the National Infrastructure Planning Association that DCOs made under EN-7 should make greater use of mechanisms where

19 Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), [National Policy Statement for nuclear power generation \(EN-6\): volume II - annexes](#), 23 June 2011, para C.2.144

20 [Q85](#)

21 Nuclear Futures Institute, Bangor University ([NPE0011](#)), p 4

Development Consent is conditional on certain requirements.²² As the Taskforce has remarked, applicants can spend years in pre-application. We heard from the Interim Chief Planning Inspector about the extensive assessment and consultation that drives this lengthy phase..²³ If developers had greater confidence in securing a DCO subject to conditions, they might move to examination more quickly. We have heard however that the complexity of the planning system, for nuclear just as for projects such as the Lower Thames Crossing, incentivises a conservative attitude at pre-application.²⁴ As Sam Dumitriu and Michael Hill of Britain Remade write in a recent report on the cost of nuclear:

the knowledge that every word in a 80,000 page (or even longer) planning application will be tested in court embeds caution into every decision. Unnecessary surveys are commissioned. The strictest interpretation of every aspect of planning guidance and environmental guidance is taken as written. Projects move slower as a result and expensive environmental mitigations are proposed.²⁵

27. The Interim Chief Planning Inspector also observed that the Planning Act 2008 allows consents from different statutory bodies to be combined within a DCO, subject (under section 150) to regulators' agreement.²⁶ The Act has been amended before to codify this agreement so, for example, a marine licence can now be sought either from the Marine Management Office under section 150 or included in a DCO under the new section 149A.²⁷
28. EN-7 does recognise the interplay between planning and regulatory regimes. Paragraphs 2.4.4–2.4.6 instruct the Examining Authority and the Secretary of State not to delay or refuse Development Consent simply because other permits are outstanding, unless there is good reason to believe they will not be granted. They are also to “assume that regulatory regimes will operate effectively”.

22 [Q88](#) and [Q103](#)

23 [Q97](#)

24 [Q9](#)

25 Britain Remade, “[A policy playbook for cheaper nuclear](#)”, 16 September 2025

26 [Q79](#)

27 LexisNexis with Nicola Canty, [Development consent orders and deemed marine licences](#), April 2016 (last updated in August 2025)

29.

CONCLUSION

If planning examinations stray too far into matters reserved to other regimes this will undermine those regulators. While the exhaustive drafting of the criteria in EN-7 may simply be intended to empower the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State to consider a wide range of relevant factors, this overlooks the pressures on applicants, facing tight project schedules and litigious opponents, which will drive them to “gold plate” their applications with excessive detail to minimise the chance of delay. This could also discourage a fleet-based deployment strategy, where standardisation and replication are key to achieving economies of scale.

30.

CONCLUSION

We are deeply concerned that EN-7 fails to present a truly joined-up approach across planning, safety, and environmental regulation. The absence of robust mechanisms to coordinate these regimes risks undermining the very purpose of an NPS: to provide a definitive and coherent framework for decision-making. If the Government’s objective is to bring forward new projects efficiently, then it must confront the reality that regulatory fragmentation continues to delay progress.

31.

RECOMMENDATION

Language in section 2.4 presuming the effectiveness of regulatory regimes should be strengthened to state that the Examining Authority should require only such information as is reasonably necessary to assess planning and environmental impacts within the scope of this NPS.

32.

RECOMMENDATION

We also recommend that EN-7, or the accompanying guidance, explicitly support the use of conditional commencement mechanisms (also known as Grampian conditions). These would allow consent to be granted while restricting the start of specified works until relevant licences or authorisations are secured.

33.

RECOMMENDATION

Guidance must make clear to applicants the burden of evidence required against each criterion. Should a pipeline of DCO applications materialise, this guidance should be regularly updated as lessons are learned, rather than waiting for the next NPS review.

34.

RECOMMENDATION

The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has already called for radical reform to the regulatory landscape. It should set out how a “one stop shop” for permitting civil nuclear could operate in practice and examine whether this could be achieved without compromising safety and environmental standards. The Government should respond swiftly with policy and any legislative changes.

Future-proofing the criteria

35. EN-7 is intended to include new technologies, such as SMRs and AMRs:

This National Policy Statement is designed to support nuclear infrastructure development on a more diverse range of sites, reflecting the emerging diversity in nuclear technologies. New nuclear technologies are likely to be suitable for deployment on a wider range of sites, which may differ in size to previously identified sites, and/or be closer to locations of high energy demand.²⁸

While this is true in the sense that the NPS applies to all “infrastructure using nuclear fission to generate energy”, the criteria themselves are largely unrelated to specific technologies. This neutrality is a deliberate and understandable choice: while most advanced designs remain on the drawing board, the onus is on developers and regulators to show that they can either meet the existing criteria or offer an equivalent level of safety and resilience by other means. The Chief Nuclear Inspector told us that claims about the “passive safety” of AMRs are as yet unproven, and it would be premature to adapt siting criteria to them.²⁹

36. Talk of a “nuclear renaissance” may be easy to overstate, but development in the sector continues, and there are a number of technologies now theorised which might plausibly be deployed by 2050.³⁰ Proponents of these novel reactor designs make bold claims for their potential benefits. Besides being safer, they may deliver low-carbon industrial heat, they may be much easier to manufacture and decommission, and they may even provide a means to destroy existing stocks of long-lived radioactive nuclear waste. We will return in our roadmap inquiry to the question of how the UK ought to pursue new nuclear technologies. For now, we simply note that future designs may differ radically from present reactors in ways that affect siting.

28 DESNZ, [DRAFT: National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation](#), 11 February 2025, para 1.7.1

29 [Q69](#)

30 Dalton Nuclear Institute, University of Manchester ([NPE0025](#))

37. It is impossible to envisage all the ways in which technical innovation might interact with the criteria in EN-7, and we have made no detailed study of this. We have however had speculative evidence on how future nuclear infrastructure might be more resilient to, for example, aircraft hazards if buried underground, or to drought if cooled without water.³¹ On the other hand, we have heard that the risks posed by smaller reactors might be greater if they require more frequent refuelling,³² and that breeder reactors (those which generate new fuel as they operate) could present unique safety and security requirements for their fuel handling.³³

38. **CONCLUSION**

Looking beyond EN-7, the Government will need to start considering proposals for a more diverse fleet of reactors with different benefits and risks. A future NPS might, for certain technologies, need to disapply criteria or introduce entirely new ones.

39. With regards to the population density criterion, the Government has said it is open to modifying it “once more operational experience and further underpinning evidence around advanced nuclear technologies is available”.³⁴

40. **RECOMMENDATION**

EN-7 should signal the Government’s openness to developing more technology-specific criteria in the next nuclear NPS, and invite ongoing contributions from industry, regulators and independent experts on how siting policy can adapt to a more varied nuclear landscape.

31 Maurits Dolmans ([NPE0020](#)), Q4

32 Dr Duncan Allsopp ([NPE0022](#)), Q3

33 Mr M J Uffen ([NPE0023](#)), Q4

34 DESNZ, [National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation \(EN-7\): new consultation, and response to earlier consultation](#), 11 February 2025, para 3.6.8

3 Improvements to the draft criteria

Socioeconomic benefit

41. Building on the overarching National Policy Statement for Energy (EN-1), EN-7 requires applicants to “assess the socioeconomic the [sic] impact of the construction, operation and decommissioning of the proposed nuclear infrastructure”.³⁵ The criterion, as drafted, adds only cursory detail to the generic aspects of EN-1, but this is in the context of a strong presumption found elsewhere that:

Nuclear infrastructure is likely to be a significant workplace, wider economic driver and landscape feature for the host location and community. Energy generation infrastructure, including nuclear infrastructure, has in the past contributed to the character of places and been a source of pride and identity for residents.³⁶

Gigawatt plants

42. Evidence to this inquiry on the socioeconomic benefits of large-scale nuclear generally focussed on the number and quality of jobs in the construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear infrastructure, as well as further up and down the supply chain. (Unite the Union gives the example of Anglesey Aluminium, which closed along with nearby Wylfa nuclear power station).³⁷ Conversely, the Institute for Public Policy Research points out in its evidence the socioeconomic harm that uncertainty over future investment can cause to communities with established nuclear workforces:

35 DESNZ, [DRAFT: National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation](#), 11 February 2025, para 2.9.61

36 DESNZ, [DRAFT: National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation](#), 11 February 2025, para, 2.2.1

37 Unite the Union ([NPE0015](#)), footnote 9, para 2.8

The nuclear sector has created long-standing relationships with local communities and nuclear jobs are often some of the best paid in the region. However, this also makes some undiversified economies exposed if there are delays to new projects or no plans to build on existing sites when plants retire.³⁸

43. We heard examples of developers taking steps to ensure that the communities hosting nuclear infrastructure see the benefit of these jobs, and that better paid roles are not just “Monday to Thursday jobs” held by workers living afar.³⁹ At Sizewell C, the developer is relocating engineering activity to Ipswich, establishing a new further education college in Leiston to improve access to training, and offering degree apprenticeships to local students. The DCO incorporates a Deed of Obligation with binding requirements for a third of jobs and apprenticeships to go to people in the region, which Julia Pyke told us: “is right and proper. They bear the construction disruption; they should be principal beneficiaries of the economic benefit”.⁴⁰
44. Sizewell C may yet offer a further example of the spillover benefits that can come from a large infrastructure project. The DCO covers upgrades to the track and signalling of the railway branch line between Saxmundham and Leiston, to enable freight transport to the construction site. Julia Pyke told us she hopes that these upgrades can allow the Department for Transport to restore passenger services to Leiston.⁴¹

Smaller reactors

45. Nuclear plants have traditionally been large local employers, and operators have sometimes seen their “social licence” to operate as deriving from their connections to and visibility in the local area.⁴² The proposed business model for small modular reactors (SMRs) intentionally departs from this, seeking efficiencies through off-site assembly line manufacture. We have considered how this might alter the relationship between nuclear infrastructure and host communities, particularly where fewer workers are required on site and local people are less likely to know someone working there.

38 Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) ([NPE0004](#)), para 2

39 [Qq14–19](#)

40 [Q14](#)

41 [Q13](#)

42 See, for example, Jamie Reed, “[Sellafield: A Case Study of the Social Licence to Operate: Social Impact Multiplied](#)”, International Atomic Energy Agency conference paper, IAEA-CN--294, 1–5 November 2021, p198

46. Rolls-Royce SMR has been selected by GBE-N as the preferred bidder to develop the country's first fleet of small modular reactors.⁴³ We heard from Alastair Evans of Rolls Royce SMR that while centralised supply chain facilities will mean fewer workers on site than a gigawatt plant, the construction phase will still involve significant civil engineering activity and the operational phase will require a skilled local workforce.⁴⁴ But by most definitions of a small modular reactor, the Rolls-Royce design is, in fact, quite large. It will be housed in a building of around five acres (comparable to the Palace of Westminster) and generate 470MW of electricity (comparable to the decommissioned Magnox power stations at Sizewell and Dungeness).⁴⁵ The Government is also supporting much smaller nuclear developments, such as Last Energy's 20MW microreactor.⁴⁶ EN-7 applies to generating stations with a capacity greater than 50MW in England or 350MW in Wales. Assessment of socioeconomic impacts must therefore accommodate a wide range of reactor sizes and business models.
47. Some SMR projects may operate on a "private wire" basis, supplying electricity directly to a single industrial user rather than the national grid.⁴⁷ Public support for nuclear infrastructure may be closely tied to its purpose: polling by Sizewell C suggested stronger support for projects described as powering homes (71% support) compared to those serving industrial facilities (60%) or data centres (51%).⁴⁸ New and different use cases may affect the socioeconomic value perceived by host communities.
48. Government and developers could explore more creative mechanisms to ensure host communities share in the economic value of nuclear development. One proposal by Britain Remade is to allow councils to retain 100% of business rates from new nuclear projects, rather than 50% as at present.⁴⁹ This would provide a more direct and predictable financial benefit to local authorities and might incentivise them, in turn, to help build public support.

43 DESNZ and GBE-N, [Rolls-Royce SMR selected to build small modular nuclear reactors](#), 10 June 2025

44 [Qq11-12](#)

45 Rolls Royce SMR, "[Our technology](#)" (accessed 6 October 2025)

46 DESNZ, [Golden age of nuclear delivers UK-US deal on energy security](#), 15 September 2025

47 [Q15](#) [Alastair Evans]

48 Letter from Julia Pyke, Joint Managing Director of Sizewell C ([NPE0028](#)), 25 September 2025

49 Britain Remade, "[A policy playbook for cheaper nuclear](#)", 16 September 2025

49.

CONCLUSION

As the technology-specific NPS for nuclear, the section of EN-7 dealing with socioeconomic impacts is surprisingly quiet about the factors peculiar to nuclear developments: the long construction timelines, the specialised nature of the labour required, and the enduring presence of infrastructure in host communities. These features distinguish nuclear power from other forms of energy generation and warrant more detailed consideration.

50.

RECOMMENDATION

EN-7 should expand on the socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear infrastructure. This includes recognising the long construction periods and the potential for the creation of high-quality, long-term jobs. While EN1 generically acknowledges construction impacts and training opportunities, EN-7 and accompanying guidance should go further in setting expectations for how nuclear developers, in particular, can deliver lasting economic value to host communities.

51.

RECOMMENDATION

Besides traditional measures like apprenticeship quotas and community benefit funds, the Government should also investigate more creative mechanisms to ensure economic value from nuclear developments is captured locally. This could include doing more to encourage jointly consenting public infrastructure like roads and railways, and exploring fiscal measures like full business rate retention for local authorities. These approaches may prove more adaptable to SMRs, with their smaller geographic and economic footprint.

Population density

52.

EN7 retains the longstanding Semi-Urban Population Density Criterion (SUPDC). SUPDC is a threshold of population density in the area within 30km of a proposed nuclear reactor, weighted to give a greater (more prohibitive) score to people living nearer the site or clustered along any one radial direction.⁵⁰ New reactors are not allowed in any location exceeding the threshold, which in practice means built-up areas and their immediate surroundings.

50 Office for Nuclear Regulation, [Land use planning and the siting of nuclear installations](#), November 2024

53. The Government has chosen to maintain SUPDC to manage:
- the potential risk to populated areas from nuclear infrastructure by limiting how close to densely populated areas it can be developed, mitigating the impact in the extremely unlikely event of an incident posing a risk beyond the nuclear site boundary.⁵¹
54. In its 2025 consultation, the Government found mixed views on its decision to retain SUPDC in EN-7.⁵² By contrast, evidence to our own inquiry overwhelmingly criticised the criterion, broadly on three grounds:
- a. **Outdated basis:** The criterion dates back to the 1960s and was originally modelled on the scenario of a Magnox or AGR reactor (designs no longer built) releasing radioactive iodine,⁵³ so it may not reflect the safety profile of modern designs.⁵⁴
 - b. **Restriction of otherwise suitable sites:** Although the majority of the country by area falls below the SUPDC threshold, it excludes some sites near industrial clusters. This could limit the potential for SMRs to decarbonise heat and power.⁵⁵ It is likely to prevent expansion at Heysham and Hartlepool, which are currently operating sites.⁵⁶
 - c. **Process:** Gaining a SUPDC assessment from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) can be an opaque and time-consuming process, likened by one prospective developer to the game Battleship.⁵⁷ Applicants must pay HSE to assess a given set of coordinates against privately-held geospatial data.
55. The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce indicated in its initial report that it agrees with these representations by industry, saying:
- We believe there has been a missed opportunity to update EN-7 and have heard compelling evidence that this is preventing suitable sites from coming forward, undermining the intention to unlock new sites.⁵⁸

51 DESNZ, [National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation \(EN-7\): new consultation, and response to earlier consultation](#), 11 February 2025, para 3.6.4

52 [Letter from the Secretary of State regarding responses to the public consultation on the draft National Policy Statement on nuclear energy generation](#), 13 June 2025

53 Malcolm Grimston and William J Nuttall, “[The Siting of UK Nuclear Power Installations](#)”, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, CWPE 1344, October 2013

54 [Q21](#) [Tom Greatrex]

55 Great British Energy - Nuclear ([NPE0006](#)), Q3

56 Nuclear Industry Association ([NPE0008](#))

57 UK Nuclear Ltd ([NPE0007](#))

58 DESNZ and MOD, [Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce: interim report](#), 11 August 2025, Chapter 6

56. Separately from SUPDC, the Office for Nuclear Regulation takes its own approach to emergency planning. Several witnesses argue that, as a more rigorous and bespoke assessment, this would suffice alone. For example, the Nuclear Industry Association would prefer that we:

consider site suitability through the pre-existing requirement that the location must be suitable for establishing an adequate emergency plan in accordance with nuclear site licence conditions and the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPiR). The ONR already conducts this detailed, risk-informed, reactor-specific, and site-specific assessment as part of the nuclear site licencing process.⁵⁹

57. A further issue that may come to the fore, as the industry looks beyond existing sites towards “greenfield” nuclear installations, is the interaction between the Government’s housebuilding targets and the prospect of establishing multiple new nuclear sites, each with their own 30km SUPDC region. Witnesses have suggested to us that without reform, SUPDC could become a de facto brake on both housing and nuclear ambitions, forcing planners to choose between two national priorities.⁶⁰ Although the ONR is a statutory consultee for major housing developments near nuclear sites, nevertheless housebuilding tends over time to erode the margin a site enjoys under SUPDC, especially at those sites originally selected on a marginal basis, such as Heysham and Hartlepool. It is questionable whether the Government announcing its support for a large new nuclear development at Hartlepool, as it did in September 2025,⁶¹ is consistent with maintaining a policy widely regarded by industry⁶² as guaranteeing the failure of any DCO application at that site.
58. EN-7 does not feature a map showing SUPDC. Creating such a map is a simple task; for example, see the one produced in 1986 by Stan Openshaw in the Appendix, using computer resources incomparably less powerful than those available to any student of geography today. The Government could direct HSE to publish such a reference map for public use. This would serve the same purpose as the present system of calculation while offering greater certainty to developers, since SUPDC is useful only for definitively *ruling out* sites and has nothing to say about potential hazards in the permitted region.
59. Other demographic maps in the Appendix include a site plan of Heysham taken from EN-6, which shows a semi-urban exclusion zone extending southward from nearby housing and across the site boundary. While

59 Nuclear Industry Association ([NPE0008](#))

60 NIPA ([NPE0010](#)), Q3

61 DESNZ, [Golden age of nuclear delivers UK-US deal on energy security](#), 15 September 2025

62 Nuclear Industry Association ([NPE0008](#))

contemporary versions of these maps would indicate that some operating plants now fall within SUPDC zones,⁶³ this does not imply that they are suddenly unsafe, as they remain subject to the far more detailed and rigorous ONR site licensing process.

60.

CONCLUSION

We accept the Government's view that it is reasonable, in the absence of compelling new safety data, to exclude nuclear reactors from built-up areas. It is rightly the purpose of a national policy statement to provide a consistent definition here. However, the current SUPDC methodology serves neither transparency nor practical decision-making.

61.

RECOMMENDATION

EN-7 should, for now, retain SUPDC to avoid delaying its designation, but should replace the requirement to consult the Health and Safety Executive with a published map showing SUPDC test results for all of England and Wales at a suitable resolution (but ideally on a 100-metre grid at least for the EN-6 sites and any others identified in recent government announcements).

62.

RECOMMENDATION

The Government should commission the Office for Nuclear Regulation to develop proposals for a replacement methodology to SUPDC. The ONR could consider the risks posed by different nuclear technologies, recognising that some novel technologies may pose greater or lesser risks of radioactive release. These proposals should include the option of dispensing with SUPDC altogether and replacing its role in the DCO process with the emergency evacuation planning done through the REPIR framework.

63. The Chief Nuclear Inspector has confirmed to us that he stands ready to undertake this work if requested by DESNZ.⁶⁴

Heat

64. As we have heard in other inquiries, decarbonising heat is an important and sometimes difficult part of the transition to net zero.⁶⁵ Evidence from industry has included manufacturers who see SMRs and AMRs as a

63 NIPA ([NPE0010](#)), Q3

64 [Q75](#)

65 See, for example, oral evidence taken on 9 July 2025, [Q187](#)

promising means of supplying useful heat locally.⁶⁶ AMRs are expected to produce very high-grade heat suitable for industrial processes such as hydrogen production and desalination, particularly where reactors can be co-located with industrial clusters.⁶⁷

65. EN-1 already requires developers of thermal generating stations to consider combined heat and power,⁶⁸ a provision that appears to be drafted mainly with technologies such as gas-fired plants in mind. Lower-grade waste heat from nuclear stations may be impractical for use in district heating because of the remoteness of most sites from housing. It could however be useful for applications such as greenhouse food production or aquaculture and this could increase the economic benefit to a host community.

66. **RECOMMENDATION**

The requirement in the generic EN-1 NPS for applicants to consider the use of waste heat should be restated in more technology-specific terms within EN-7 or the accompanying guidance. This could better support applicants seeking to make productive use of nuclear-generated heat.

66 Written evidence received for the Committee's inquiry into *Revisiting the Nuclear Roadmap*, British Sugar ([NUC0004](#)), March 2025

67 [Q70](#); Dalton Nuclear Institute, University of Manchester ([NPE0025](#)), Figure 1

68 DESNZ, [Draft: Overarching National Policy Statement for energy \(EN-1\)](#), 19 May 2025, Section 4.8

Conclusions and recommendations

The criteria-based approach

1. We welcome the introduction of a framework that gives a strong presumption of consent for low-carbon generation and accommodates a broader range of nuclear technologies. However, confidence in a developer-led approach is not yet assured and will only come if DESNZ, GBE-N, and the Planning Inspectorate can collectively provide DCO applicants with the support and guidance they will need to carry out proportionate assessments against the criteria. Without this, there is a risk that the flexibility promised by EN-7 will translate into uncertainty and delay. (Conclusion, Paragraph 16)
2. As we said in our previous Report, Gridlock or Growth, there remains a fundamental tension between the Government's stated preference for a market-led approach to energy and the trend towards active government management. This is especially apparent in nuclear policy, where siting for gigawatt-scale plants has always required some degree of state backing. Given this reality, the Government needs to be considerably more explicit about what nuclear technologies it wants deployed and where it envisages them being located. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)
3. When designating EN-7, the Government should publish a plan with its preferred level and mix of nuclear technologies, indicative deployment timelines, and the role of EN-6 sites potentially suitable for gigawatt-scale plants. Each part of this plan should explain the role of GBE-N in facilitating it. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)
4. GBE-N should announce its plans for Oldbury and Wylfa without further delay, including which technologies it intends to deploy. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)
5. If planning examinations stray too far into matters reserved to other regimes this will undermine those regulators. While the exhaustive drafting of the criteria in EN-7 may simply be intended to empower the Planning Inspectorate and the Secretary of State to consider a wide range of relevant factors, this overlooks the pressures on applicants, facing tight project

schedules and litigious opponents, which will drive them to “gold plate” their applications with excessive detail to minimise the chance of delay. This could also discourage a fleet-based deployment strategy, where standardisation and replication are key to achieving economies of scale. (Conclusion, Paragraph 29)

6. We are deeply concerned that EN-7 fails to present a truly joined-up approach across planning, safety, and environmental regulation. The absence of robust mechanisms to coordinate these regimes risks undermining the very purpose of an NPS: to provide a definitive and coherent framework for decision-making. If the Government’s objective is to bring forward new projects efficiently, then it must confront the reality that regulatory fragmentation continues to delay progress. (Conclusion, Paragraph 30)
7. Language in section 2.4 presuming the effectiveness of regulatory regimes should be strengthened to state that the Examining Authority should require only such information as is reasonably necessary to assess planning and environmental impacts within the scope of this NPS. (Recommendation, Paragraph 31)
8. We also recommend that EN-7, or the accompanying guidance, explicitly support the use of conditional commencement mechanisms (also known as Grampian conditions). These would allow consent to be granted while restricting the start of specified works until relevant licences or authorisations are secured. (Recommendation, Paragraph 32)
9. Guidance must make clear to applicants the burden of evidence required against each criterion. Should a pipeline of DCO applications materialise, this guidance should be regularly updated as lessons are learned, rather than waiting for the next NPS review. (Recommendation, Paragraph 33)
10. The Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce has already called for radical reform to the regulatory landscape. It should set out how a “one stop shop” for permitting civil nuclear could operate in practice and examine whether this could be achieved without compromising safety and environmental standards. The Government should respond swiftly with policy and any legislative changes. (Recommendation, Paragraph 34)
11. Looking beyond EN-7, the Government will need to start considering proposals for a more diverse fleet of reactors with different benefits and risks. A future NPS might, for certain technologies, need to disapply criteria or introduce entirely new ones. (Conclusion, Paragraph 38)

12. EN-7 should signal the Government's openness to developing more technology-specific criteria in the next nuclear NPS, and invite ongoing contributions from industry, regulators and independent experts on how siting policy can adapt to a more varied nuclear landscape. (Recommendation, Paragraph 40)


Improvements to the draft criteria

13. As the technology-specific NPS for nuclear, the section of EN-7 dealing with socioeconomic impacts is surprisingly quiet about the factors peculiar to nuclear developments: the long construction timelines, the specialised nature of the labour required, and the enduring presence of infrastructure in host communities. These features distinguish nuclear power from other forms of energy generation and warrant more detailed consideration. (Conclusion, Paragraph 49)
14. EN-7 should expand on the socioeconomic impacts specific to nuclear infrastructure. This includes recognising the long construction periods and the potential for the creation of high-quality, long-term jobs. While EN1 generically acknowledges construction impacts and training opportunities, EN-7 and accompanying guidance should go further in setting expectations for how nuclear developers, in particular, can deliver lasting economic value to host communities. (Recommendation, Paragraph 50)
15. Besides traditional measures like apprenticeship quotas and community benefit funds, the Government should also investigate more creative mechanisms to ensure economic value from nuclear developments is captured locally. This could include doing more to encourage jointly consenting public infrastructure like roads and railways, and exploring fiscal measures like full business rate retention for local authorities. These approaches may prove more adaptable to SMRs, with their smaller geographic and economic footprint. (Recommendation, Paragraph 51)
16. We accept the Government's view that it is reasonable, in the absence of compelling new safety data, to exclude nuclear reactors from built-up areas. It is rightly the purpose of a national policy statement to provide a consistent definition here. However, the current SUPDC methodology serves neither transparency nor practical decision-making. (Conclusion, Paragraph 60)
17. EN-7 should, for now, retain SUPDC to avoid delaying its designation, but should replace the requirement to consult the Health and Safety Executive with a published map showing SUPDC test results for all of England

and Wales at a suitable resolution (but ideally on a 100-metre grid at least for the EN-6 sites and any others identified in recent government announcements). (Recommendation, Paragraph 61)

18. The Government should commission the Office for Nuclear Regulation to develop proposals for a replacement methodology to SUPDC. The ONR could consider the risks posed by different nuclear technologies, recognising that some novel technologies may pose greater or lesser risks of radioactive release. These proposals should include the option of dispensing with SUPDC altogether and replacing its role in the DCO process with the emergency evacuation planning done through the REPPIR framework. (Recommendation, Paragraph 62)
19. The requirement in the generic EN-1 NPS for applicants to consider the use of waste heat should be restated in more technology-specific terms within EN-7 or the accompanying guidance. This could better support applicants seeking to make productive use of nuclear-generated heat. (Recommendation, Paragraph 66)

Appendix: Mapping the Semi-Urban Population Density Criterion




Semi urban criterion, Heysham, EN-6, 2011⁶⁹

100m grid squares, calculated using HSE's National Population Database.

69 [Maps supporting the Strategic Siting Assessment](#), National Policy Statement for nuclear power generation (EN-6): volume II - annexes, 2011

“Infeasible sites in Britain according to a strict application of the NII’s relaxed siting policy”⁷⁰

Estimates from 1km grid squares based on 1981 census data



“Map showing the parts of England and Wales excluded as a result of the demographic criterion”⁷¹

Calculated using HSE’s National Population Database for each 500m grid square across England and Wales.



70 Stan Openshaw, Nuclear Power: Siting and Safety, 1986, p155

71 Appendix D1, [A consideration of alternative sites to those nominated as part of the Government’s Strategic Siting Assessment process for new nuclear power stations](#), Atkins for the Department of Energy and Climate Change, 2009

Formal minutes

Tuesday 21 October 2025

Members present:

Bill Esterson (Chair)

Ms Polly Billington

Sir Christopher Chope

Torcuil Crichton

Wera Hobhouse

Luke Murphy

Claire Young

The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation

Draft Report (*The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 66 read and agreed to.

Appendix agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fourth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 134.

Adjournment

Adjourned till Wednesday 22 October 2025 at 2.30pm.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 10 September 2025

Alastair Evans, Director of Corporate Affairs and Investor Relations, Rolls-Royce SMR; **Julia Pyke**, Joint Managing Director, Sizewell C; **Tom Greatrex**, Chief Executive, Nuclear Industry Association [Q1-50](#)

Catherine Anderson, Board member, National Infrastructure Planning Association; **Mike Finnerty**, Chief Executive and Chief Nuclear Inspector, Office for Nuclear Regulation; **Rebecca Phillips**, Interim Chief Planning Inspector, Planning Inspectorate [Q51-109](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

NPE numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	Allsopp, Dr Duncan (Consultant Electrical Engineer)	NPE0022
2	Amentum	NPE0026
3	Assystem	NPE0021
4	Barrett, Professor Mark (Professor of Energy and Environmental Systems Modelling, UCL Energy Institute)	NPE0024
5	Blackwater Against New Nuclear Group (BANNG)	NPE0017
6	Centrica	NPE0027
7	Colchester City Council	NPE0005
8	Dalton Nuclear Institute, University of Manchester	NPE0025
9	Dolmans, Maurits (Member of the public)	NPE0020
10	EDF	NPE0002
11	Eaglen, Dr Christopher (Nuclear Engineering and Planning and Procurement and Contract Management, Dr Chris Eaglen)	NPE0001
12	Great British Energy - Nuclear	NPE0006
13	Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)	NPE0004
14	Institution of Engineering and Technology	NPE0009
15	newcleo	NPE0018
16	NIPA	NPE0010
17	Nuclear Futures Institute, Bangor University	NPE0011
18	Nuclear Industry Association	NPE0008
19	Office for Nuclear Regulation	NPE0029
20	Rolls Royce Submarines Limited	NPE0019
21	Sizewell C	NPE0028
22	Sizewell C	NPE0014

23	Taylor, Mr Michael	<u>NPE0003</u>
24	Together Against Sizewell C	<u>NPE0016</u>
25	UK Nuclear Ltd	<u>NPE0007</u>
26	Uffen, Mr M J	<u>NPE0023</u>
27	Unite the Union	<u>NPE0015</u>
28	X-energy UK	<u>NPE0012</u>

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
3rd	Pre-appointment hearing for the Chair of the Climate Change Committee	HC 1186
2nd	Gridlock or growth? Avoiding energy planning chaos	HC 868
1st	Retrofitting homes for net zero	HC 453
1st Special	Retrofitting homes for net zero: Government Response	HC 1260